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Who Is "Driver" and What Constitutes '-'Operating" or 'Driving"
Within the Meaning of Statutory Offenses
In a recent Georgia case, Mitchell v. State,' the defendant and other
persons had planned a race between an automobile belonging to the
defendant and an automobile belonging to one Walden, both vehicles
to be driven by persons other than the owners themselves. During the
race the defendant and Walden rode in their respective cars, alongside
the selected drivers. The race proceeded on the highway at speeds
ranging up to 75 and 95 miles per hour to a point where Walden's car
turned over several times, killing its driver. The defendant was prosecuted and convicted of the misdemeanor of driving an automobile upon
a public highway in excess of the prescribed speed limit. At the trial
the court charged the jury that in all misdemeanors the participants
are principals, and the court further instructed the jury to the effect
that if the defendant aided and abetted the operation of the automobile
he thus became a principal. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed
the judgment and held that the charge presented explicitly and fairly
the law of principal and accessory as applied to the evidence in a misdemeanor case; also, that from the evidence the jury were authorized
to find the defendant guilty of "operating" an automobile at a greater
rate of speed than that prescribed by law.
In civil cases involving automobile accidents, similar rules of law are
applied when negligence is imputed to a passenger. The law is that
the negligence of the operator of an automobile is not attributable to
a'guest or passenger, whether gratuitous or for hire, -where such guest
or passenger has no right of control over the operator or machine, and
exercises no control over either.2 However, there is an exception
allowing imputation of negligence in the case bf one riding with his
servant or agent as driver, and this exception is grounded upon the
fact that the negligence of the servant is the negligence of the master;
in other words, the master (passenger) is operating the machine
through the agency of the servant- (driver). The test whether the
negligence of the driver is to be imputed to the one riding depends
upon the latter's control, or right of control, of the actions of the
driver, so as to constitute in fact the relation of principal and agent or
master and servant, or his voluntary, unconstrained, noncontractual
surrender of all care for himself to the caution of the driver 3 If an
occupant of an automobile controls, or has the right of control over,
the operation of the car in maiter of detail, he is chargeable with the
operator's negligence. The operator is deemed to -be the servant of
such person. 4
The instant case may also be compared to civil cases where persons
are associated together in the execution of a common purpose and
undertaking, and it has been' held that each is the agent of the others
in carrying out their plans, so that the negligence of one is attributable
to the others.5 To constitute a joint enterprise between a passenger
and the driver of an automobile, within the meaning of the law of
negligence, there must be such a community of interests in the opera1 -- Ga. App. ,38 S.E. (2d) 95 (1946).
2 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7th ed. 1935) §5.141.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at §5.143.

GPhiladelphia & R. R. Co. v. Le Barr, 265 Fed. 129 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1920).
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tion as to give each an equal right of control. Joint enterprise is the
joint prosecution of a common purpose under such circumstances that
each member of such enterprise has the authority to act in respect to
the control of the agencies employed to execute such common purpose. 6
In prosecutions for motor vehicle violations, a variety of issues and
complicating factors arise when a person permits another to drive the
automobile while he sits by as a passenger. The question then is, what
do the statutes mean by "driving" an automobile? Under such circumstances can a person be charged with "driving" an automobile? Under
some state statutes the person must be actually driving, 7 meaning
physical handling of the controls of the vehicle, but under other state
statutes one who aids or abets the act may be liable as principal.8 If
the owner of a dangerous instrumentality like an automobile knowingly puts that instrumentality in the immediate control of a careless
and reckless driver, sits by his side, and permits him without protest
to recklessly and negligently operate the car and thereby cause the
death of another, he is as much responsible as the man at the wheel.9
A conviction of negligent homicide by the use of a motor vehicle,
under a Michigan statute, was affirmed where it appeared that the
defendant sat by the side of a girl and that when the girl, just before
the collision, lost control of the car in descending a hill, the defendant
attempted to resume control of the car and stepped on the accelerator
but was unable to avoid running into the other car.10 In another case
the defendant was convicted of murder where he and his companion
were "staging a drunk" in the car of the defendant who sat beside the
driver companion in the front seat, the episode culminating in the
death of an infant. 1
In a recent case the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter where it appeared that the truck in question belonged to the
defendant who was on the front seat at the time of the collision; the
court finding that even if he was not actually driving (as the defendant
contended) he was guilty as a principal for aiding and abetting in an
unlawful operation of the vehicle, since he was not so drunk but that
he knew what was happening and must have known that the truck
was being driven on the wrong side of the road in an unlawful manner.12 A conviction has been sustained where a woman driver was at
the steering wheel, but the defendant sat close beside her and both he
and the woman had hold of the steering wheel.' 3 However, in a case
where the car that struck the deceased was driven by an intoxicated
driver, who was accompanied by the owner as a passenger, the evidence was held insufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter
against the owner where there was no evidence that he ever saw the
driver take a drink or knew that the driver was under the influence
of liquor.14
A provision of the vehicle code requiring the "driver of any vehicle"
6 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7th ed. 1935) §5.158.
7 State v. Williams, 141 Wash. 165, 251 Pac. 126 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Gordan, 310 Mass. 85, 37 N.E. (2d) 123 (1941).
8 State v. Myers, 207 Iowa 555, 223 N.W. 166 (1929) ; State v. Sarner,
134 Kan. 98, 4 P. (2d) 440 (1931); State v. Cook, 149 Kan. 481, 87 P.
(2d) 648 (1939).
9 Story v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 342 (App. D.C. 1926) ; Ex Parte
Liotard, 47 Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923).
10 People v. Ingersoll, 245 Mich. 530, 222 N.W. 765 (1929).
11 Brewer v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 9, 143 S.W. (2d) 599 (1940).
12 Fitzhugh v. State, 207 Ark. 117, 179 S.W. (2d) 173 (1944).
3- Cochran v. State, 141 Fla. 467, 193 So. 535 (1940).
14 State v. Creech, 210 N.C. 700, 188 S.E. 316 (1936).
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involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to stop immediately and render assistance, has been held to apply with equal force
to the defendant-owner riding as a passenger therein at the time of
the accident. 15
In determining liability under an automobile collision insurance
policy which excluded liability if the automobile was being operated
or manipulated by any person prohibited from driving or unauthorized
by law to drive, it has been held that where the insured permitted a
16 year old girl with no operator's license to drive and placed his hand
on the wheel or steadied or turned it, he did not thereby become the
"driver" or "operator" of the automobile.' 6 In a similar case, however,
it was held that the insured was the "driver" when just before the car
struck a pedestrian he reached over, steered, and applied the emergency brake without interference from the 16 year old girl occupying
17
the driver's seat.
As to what amounts to the "operation" of an automobile within the
meaning of a statute prohibiting "operation" under certain conditions,'8 it has been held that getting into an automobile and starting
the engine constitutes "operation" of the automobile; 19 one who guides
an automobile while it is being towed is "operating" it within the
meaning of a statute prohibiting operation of such vehicle by an intoxicated person; 20 where one enters his automobile, steps on the
starter and permits the engine to idle, while other persons are entering
the car, he is "operating" the car, although it stands still21 Contrary
emphasizing the
rulings have been made in some cases, however, 22
principle that motion is an integral aspect of driving.
From a review of the cases cited, the answer to the question as to
who is "driver" and what constitutes "operating" or "driving" within
the meaning of the statutes, depends in each case upon the interpretation of the individual state courts as to the meaning of the words "operating" and "driving." The decisions allowing a person riding and not
actually in the driver's seat, to come within the meaning of the words
"operating" or "driving," appear to be based upon a fair and sound
rule of law, and to give a just interpretation to the intent of the legislatures in passing such statutes for the protection of innocent persons
upon the highways. The legal theories of imputed negligence, joint
enterprise, aiders and abettors considered as principal, by which the
courts reach this result, are old and tested legal principles.
Joel Win. Townsend
People v. Odom (Cal. App.) 66 P. (2d) 206 (1937).
16 Twogood v. American Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Ass'n, 229
Iowa 1133, 296 N.W. 239 (1941).
17 Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. McIver et al., 27 F. Supp. 702
(S.D. Calif. 1939).
18 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7th ed. 1935) §5.386.
19 State v. Ray, 4 N.J. Misc. 493, 133 Atl. 486 (1926) ; State v. Storrs,
105 Vt. 180, 163 AtI. 560 (1933).
20 State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 Atl. 68 (1930).
21 State v. Webb, 202 Iowa 633, 210 N.W. 731 (1926).
22 State v. Hatcher, 210 N.C. 55, 185 S.E. 435 (1936); Wheeler v.
State, 67 Okla. Crim. 291, 94 P. (2d) 9 (1939); People v. Kelley (Cal.
App.) 70 P. (2d) 276 (1937).
'5

